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of.. .voter allegiance to accustomed benefits." Pierson (1996:176) has proposed that "politicians are likely to pursue strategies that will not damage their chances for reelection." between opinion and policy (for reviews, see Burstein 1998; Manza and Cook 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2004, 2005) . Further, the appearance of truly comparable cross-national survey data create new possibilities for systematic examination of whether, when, and ultimately how public opinion influences policy outputs.
The starting point of this emerging literature is the identification of policy responsiveness as central to the operation of national legislatures (see Page and Shapiro 1983; Wlezien 1995; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002) . The 1 Amenta, Caren, and Olasky (2005) provide a welcome recent exception in the critical literature on public opinion, reporting evidence that public preferences and institutional arrangements, alongside Townsend movement activity, influenced state-level old age benefits in the United States during the 1930s.
See Burstein (1998) for detailed discussion of the potential utility of considering mass opinion in comparative/historical scholarship on policymaking. SOCIAL POLICY RESPONSIVENESS 475 key assumption is that within democratic polities, politicians have incentive to take into account the public policy preferences of voters so as to reduce the risk of electoral loss (for themselves or for members of their party) as well as the possibility of public reprisals in the form of civil disobedience or protests. To be sure, the assumption of policy responsiveness may fail to describe accurately opinion/policy linkages if, for example, mass opinion is either incoherent or if politicians are consistently able to deceive voters with respect to the policy output of government (e.g., Herbst 1998; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000) . The relationship is also probabilistic: levels of responsiveness may vary between countries, over time, or with respect to the specific policy domain under investigation (Burstein 2003) .
To date, research on policy responsiveness has focused almost entirely on the case of the United States, presenting evidence for the influence of aggregate opinion over the legislative output of Congress and the presidency (see Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien 1995; Erikson et al. 2002) , and also at the subnational level of state government (Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Berry et al. 1998) . Moving beyond the U.S. case and using country-specific measures of mass opinion, several innovative studies have presented evidence for linkages between mass policy preferences and the overall level of government spending within Canada (Petry 1999; Soroka and Wlezien 2004) , Germany (Brooks 1990) , and the United Kingdom (Soroka and Wlezien 2005) .
The empirical focus of opinion/policy research has generally been on aggregated government spending as a whole (or, in the American case, aggregated legislative output), and not on social policy-making or welfare state output per se. The evidence presented in these studies, however, is quite consistent with the possibility that government officials respond to public preferences concerning the welfare state, resulting in what we will term "social policy responsiveness."
In this article, we assess the impact of mass policy preferences on the overall output of welfare states. Our approach incorporates innovations developed in recent comparative welfare state scholarship and the new literature on opinion/policy linkages. Our empirical analyses take into account established factors behind welfare state policy output, adding measures of mass opinion. We emphasize that our goal is constructive. We seek to consider whether mass opinion may complement the established wisdom in comparative welfare state scholarship.
The article is in four parts. In the first, we discuss our theoretical approach to understanding the possible influence of mass opinion on welfare states. We take as an initial point of departure limitations in early work on national values that may have provided scholars with a disincentive to pursue further research. We next consider assumptions underlying social policy responsiveness, and related propositions about mass opinion that can be derived from power resources and path dependency theories. In part two, we describe the new dataset we have con- in democratic capitalist societies (see, e.g., Lipset 1963; Rimlinger 1971; Coughlin 1980) . The "national values" approach was innovative for its time, yet it lacked comparable public opinion data and was unable to specify in concrete terms the causal mechanisms behind policy responsiveness. Its limitations were noted, and they disposed some critics to doubt the validity of any welfare state explanation making reference to mass opinion (Skocpol 1992; Steinmo 1994; Immergut 1998) . These critical commentaries and the limitations of the national values approach are worth exploring in greater detail, as a prelude to our reconsideration of the political relevance of mass opinion.
Critics of the national values approa that its static conception of values made the latter a poor device with which to understand the comparative and historical development of social insurance programs within particular national settings (Skocpol 1992; Steinmo 1994) .
Indeed, because such values were frequently viewed as established by national and industrial revolutions (Lipset 1963) , their apparent stability appeared to render them incapable of explaining subsequent patterns of public policy change.
The values concept was also viewed by critics as analytically vague, with the precise causal mechanism at work-such as politicians' decision-making, organized interest groups, media frames, the mass public-being unclear. Liberal ideas of various sorts, for example, appeared to be influential in both the British and American contexts, yet the timing and programmatic details of pension programs varied significantly between these two countries, casting doubt on national values as a causal mechanism behind comparative welfare state variation (Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988; Orloff 1993 ).
These limitations are important, yet it would be premature to dismiss, once and for all, the possibility that mass opinion influences welfare state output. Public opinion theory and research has developed considerably since national values scholarship, and an updated theoretical approach begins to address earlier limitations. Starting with the static character of values, contemporary theories of public opinion tend to view the policy preferences of mass publics as a product of factors embedded within specific social and historical contexts (e.g., Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Page and Shapiro 1992; Dalton 1996) .2 Opinion research now 2 While our focus is on the social policy influence documents, systematically and with truly comparable public opinion data, considerable historical and cross-national variation (e.g. , Smith 1987; Svallfors 1997; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003) . The concept of mass opinion is analytically specific, referring to the policy preferences of citizens within a specific country and time period. Indeed, it is this concept that has been the focus within the emerging tradition of opinion/policy research (e.g. Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson et al. 1995; Erikson et al. 2002) .
The comparative diversity of policy preferences across countries is fairly well known and can be observed in Figure 1 . (Hansen 1991; see also Fenno 1978) , and social movement mobilization can also convey information about mass opinion to politicians (Burstein 1999 To this end, we apply a test for endogeneity developed by Hausman (1978; Davidson and MacKinnon 1993:237-39 (ISSP 1988 (ISSP , 1993 (ISSP , 1994 (ISSP , 1999 (ISSP , 2001 a Country-years in the analysis: Australia (1987 Australia ( , 1991 Australia ( , 1997 Australia ( , 1999 , Austria (1994 Austria ( , 2000 , Canada (1997) , France (1998 ), Germany (1986 , 1991 , 1992 , 1997 ), Ireland (1992 , 1997 ), Italy (1991 , 1997 , Japan (1997 Japan ( , 1999 , Netherlands (1992 ), New Zealand (1992 , Norway (1991 Norway ( , 1997 Norway ( , 1999 , Sweden (1997 ), Switzerland (2000 , United Kingdom (1986 Kingdom ( , 1991 Kingdom ( , 1992 Kingdom ( , 1997 Kingdom ( , 1999 , United States (1986, 1991, 1992, 1997, 1999) .
b Old age benefits, survivor benefits, disability and sickness benefits, health services, family benefits and services, active labor market programs, unemployment benefits, housing, and residual provisions (including immigration policies).
and it provides a more comprehensive index of welfare state benefits and services than was available in the 1990s. In Table 1 
SOCIAL POLICY PREFERENCES
To measure mass policy preferences in crossnational and historical perspective, we use data from five ISSP surveys (1988, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2001) Initial analysis of this battery revealed that the pair of items in Table 2 From the standpoint of institutional theorizing, the constitutional design of political institutions is a central factor behind social policy output (Swank 2002) , particularly the degree to which the structure of institutions creates opportunities for social policy reforms to be blocked by organized interest groups. We follow Huber and Stephens (2001: chap. 3) by including a measure of the quantity of "veto points" within a polity. As summarized in Table 2, The robust-cluster approach is useful under these conditions (see Moller et al. 2003) , delivering correct standard errors in the presence of unequal variance among the error terms. Unlike the Huber-White estimator, however, the robustcluster approach remains valid in the presence of errors that are correlated within units, including serially correlated errors (Rogers 1993 ). In the course of the analysis, we also compare the robust-cluster approach with random-effects and fixed-effects estimators (Hsiao 1986 ). This analysis favors the robust-cluster approach, using Raftery's Bayesian Information Criterion 
RESULTS
Are social policy preferences exogenous or endogenous with respect to our dependent variable measuring welfare state spending effort? As a first step in the analyses, we test for endogeneity with respect to the interrelationship of social policy preferences and welfare state effort using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1993) extension of the Hausman (1978) test for endogeneity. In Table 3 , a significant coefficient would indicate the presence of endogeneity, whereas 4 BIC for the fixed-effects model is 79, and this positive score indicates an unacceptable fit to data (relative to a baseline model with no independent variables, and thus a BIC score of 0). In contrast, the negative BIC score for the random-effects model (-35) indicates an acceptable fit relative to the baseline model, though the further, -12 improvement using the robust-cluster model (-47) favors that model. Though coefficients from random-effects models are not perfectly identical to those obtained using the robustcluster approach, both sets of estimates lead to a comparable set of findings. a nonsignificant coefficient suggests no grounds for endogeneity. In the table's first row, ficient (using robust-cluster estimation) is not close to achieving statistical significance, including with respect to a generous p < .10 threshold. As summarized in the second row of Table 3 , a further application of the endogeneity test using the random-effects estimator yields very similar results and an identical conclu- 
None of the other interactions involving
Christian democracies, social democracies, or political institutions appears close to significance: for Christian democracies, the coefficient is .68 (s.e. = 1.28); for social democracies, the coefficient is -.68 (s.e. = 1.28); and for political institutions, the coefficient is .21 (s.e. = .17). Results for our supplemental dependent variable of welfare state transfers lead to congruent findings (see Table Si In Table 4 
100%
Observed difference in welfare effort +10%
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; LFP = labor force participation.
a Decomposition estimates do not all sum to 100 percent due to rounding error. (Wlezien 1995; Erikson et al. 2002; Burstein 1998 Burstein , 2003 
